Center in downtown Sydney hosted weight lifting, boxing, and judo, and then all around New South Wales were events such as the shooting and equestrian events and baseball. To the east of Sydney, on Bondi Beach, there was beach volleyball. That's an Olympic event. Go figure. If I can participate in it, it's not an Olympic event. I can tell you that much.
The actual site of the Olympics was Homebush, a multiacre facility 14 km west of the central business district. Fifteen different events occurred at Homebush. The crowning glory of Homebush was the Olympic Stadium, which held about 110,000 people.
I give you these data as background, but when you think about the threats of terrorism, with a village like this and a stadium filled with 110,000 people, some of the concerns are obvious. Let me give you a sense of some of the threats and the threat analysis that went on over the course of planning for the Olympics. First, the greatest threat targets were considered to be Homebush or the Olympic Village itself as well as Darling Harbor, where on any given day there would be 400,000 or 500,000 people wandering not just in the Olympic venues but, because it's such a beautiful facility, around the harbor itself. Two or three events as well were considered high-threat targets: the opening and closing ceremonies, where there were significant numbers of people, the closing fireworks display in downtown Sydney, and the arrival of the torch in downtown Sydney the night before the opening ceremony. Clearly, the American and Israeli teams were considered high-profile targets, and extra security was involved in their movement.
Three family hotels in downtown Sydney hosted what they called the Olympic family, which included many of the officials and relatives of the athletes. They were considered softer targets because the level of security at those hotels did not come close to that at the Olympic venues themselves. Clearly, the high-profile visitors to the Olympics were considered targets. For instance, Chelsea Clinton and Secretary Shalala represented the United States and the official delegation. Chelsea was there for about 2 1 /2 weeks.
Sydney itself is home to about 3.5 million people. During the Olympics on an average day, there were about 400,000 additional people in downtown Sydney wandering around. Throughout the Olympics, there were about 11,000 athletes, 50,000 volunteers, 5,000 officials, and 15,000 official media personnel in the city; there were an additional 15,000 members of the media who were not officially credentialed, and they tended to stay on the outskirts of the official venues.
Interestingly, and this was one of the challenges that they had, there were 12 or 13 cruise ships in the harbor that were used as hotels, and companies like NBC brought guests in to stay there for several days. That was their hotel, their convention center, and then they rotated other groups in and out of Sydney on these cruise ships.
In terms of numbers, when you look at some of the targets, for example, when the torch arrived in downtown Sydney the night before the Olympics, there were an additional 400,000 people crowding the square outside of town hall. During the opening and closing ceremonies, there were 110,000 people in the stadium plus another 120,000 people in various hospitality booths in Homebush itself. On an average night during the closing and opening ceremonies, there would be about 230,000 to 250,000 people in the Olympic Village. The closing ceremony in downtown Sydney brought 1.5 million people to the downtown area itself.
An important thing to note is the city of Sydney had six or eight sites that were not Olympic venues. These sites could accommodate 60,000 or 70,000 people. They had big-screen TVs and bands and were open 24 hours a day, by and large. People could go in and watch events live. Basically, there was no security in any of these venues. In fact, one night they had to shut a venue because the crowds got out of control, and there were problems with people climbing up on the TVs on lamp posts. They expected about 8 million people at these six live sites throughout the course of the Olympics.
I mentioned earlier that the goal was to protect Sydney. For the other venues-Adelaide, Canberra, Brisbane, and Melbourne-there was no federal involvement in the planning other than some intelligence sharing. Sydney had predeployed teams and a host of equipment that was bought and predeployed also. The only equipment that Melbourne and Brisbane received was a push package from the United States with antibiotics and some personal protective equipment from Australia's military stockpile. This, however, was not allowed to be opened unless there was an actual event. Most of it was stored 2 to 3 hours outside the city at the nearest military base. So, for instance, if someone was in urgent need of Mark One kits, which were part of the cache, a 2-hour mobilization was required to get it there. Those involved in planning for these events know that 2 hours is far too much time when dealing with organophosphates.
This was a major issue as we were working on Melbourne. Basically, Melbourne had to buy everything on its own. Brisbane had to do the same. All of the supplies had to be purchased on their own because they received little or no assistance from the national government. The New South Wales Department of Health was responsible for dealing with bioterrorism in the state of New South Wales; in Brisbane, Queensland Health; and in Melbourne, Victoria Health. New South Wales had worked on this problem basically from 1994.
As the Olympics approached, the officials put in place a number of plans. They looked at the issues that could impact the Olympics, and it's important to note that a lot of these had to do with things other than bioterrorism. However, the strategies were very similar whether planning for a food-borne outbreak or a bioterrorist event. Clearly, the clandestine release of a biological agent is a major concern, and certainly Tom Clancy's book Rainbow Six didn't dampen their concern. I'm sure everybody has read Clancy's book, the plot of which involved Ebola or Marburg virus being sprayed in the cooling system at the Olympic Stadium. There were no cooling systems like that at Sydney's Olympic Stadium, but Clancy did a good job on the book and got everyone's attention.
Although there was no specific threat information regarding bioterrorism in Australia, it was a concern. The Aum Shinrikio did their initial work in Western Australia where their labs were.
The officials put in place a very comprehensive strategy that involved prevention, detection, response, and communications. The prevention strategy worked best because we didn't have any incidents at the Olympics, but intelligence and law enforcement played very key roles in ensuring good communication in tracking individuals, making sure they knew who was coming into the country, and monitoring any threats. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had a significant contingent there, and in addition other agencies from the United States were well represented in the intelligence and law enforcement cluster. They did implement some strategies for prevention that were fairly simplistic, such as restricting flights over Homebush. Surprisingly, though, during major events in downtown Sydney, there would be six or eight helicopters flying over the city. When considering bioterrorism and these planes trailing banners, it is evident that they are ideal vehicles for disseminating agents. However, there didn't seem to be much concern about restriction of these types of aircraft over the downtown venues.
There was very tight entry security into all of the Olympic venues, but the focus was mostly bombs and guns. Surprisingly, one could walk into Homebush with a bottle of fluid or liquid and receive no challenge at all. There was the sense that they were looking for either bombs or guns and nothing else. Security personnel had no training. Those doing the searches were not police officers (who were nearby at the magnetometers). By and large, the searchers were either volunteers or people from other agencies who wound up manning the entry points. Finally, officials felt, as far as prevention is concerned, that they used public relations very aggressively to let people know security was going to be tight. They believed it would be a disincentive to people if they recognized the strict security. They also let people know that they had good response plans in place, which they believed would be a disincentive as well.
Regarding detection and environmental monitoring, there are no excellent environmental monitors that can be put in place. It is a continuing challenge. The officials used wet-walled cyclone samplers and basically tested samples inside the samplers. They brought the samplers to the lab two or three times a day to see whether there was, in fact, anything in the environment that would pose a risk. If they found something at a venue, they would use the handheld assays for testing.
The heart and soul of the entire Olympic monitoring system was a very sophisticated surveillance system put in place by the New South Wales Department of Health, and that involved a host of information being disseminated on a daily basis. The Public Health Network was their normal reporting system, enhanced for the Olympics. They used information from the World Health Organization to learn about events worldwide to assess whether anything unusual occurred in another country and to see whether it surfaced in Australia. They did environmental monitoring, and then Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) had their own medical system within the fence of the village, and that tracked very closely as well. The officials held daily briefings and sorted through the data from the previous 24 hours to detect any patterns that might have shifted, any changes, and any emerging patterns. They also looked at what was going on inside the fence (e.g., any patient contacts that occurred at the Olympic Village) to see whether there were any trends among athletes and visitors. The public health investigation teams were mobilized rapidly if they found evidence of suspicious activity within the village.
Finally, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) had well-trained teams prepositioned at Homebush and Sydney in the event of a chemical, biological, or radiological incident. (Several of the members came to the United States and Canada for training and worked very closely with many of the agencies here.) These teams were not as involved if the attack was a clandestine release. In addition, the Fire Department had medical response teams at various venues that they could mobilize, and they also had additional physician support outside of Sydney that they could fly in if they needed help quickly.
New South Wales was the lead agency for managing the consequences of a clandestine release. It was theirs to own. It was something they would have to deal with because it was not a response. It was a public health emergency. They were supported by the ADF, and the United States had significant stockpiles as well. Bob Knouss and Mike Anderson were there during the Olympics and served as liaisons to the Australian government. They also worked closely with Bayer Pharmaceuticals to ensure additional pharmaceutical capability in the event of an attack. They had plans for augmenting hospital staffing through the New South Wales medical disaster plan if a major incident occurred. Surprisingly, there was not much emphasis on how they would achieve mass prophylaxis or mass vaccination if needed.
Communications was also an important part of their response, and they actually had a communications plan. The most important thing that they wanted to get across in the event of an incident was that they spoke with one voice, so there would not be conflicting information to cause the public to lose confidence, something we continue to struggle with in the United States.
Most of the incidents encountered were bomb related. Just before the start of the Olympics, a package was found on the subway, which was detonated by the Police Department. It turned out to be a relatively amateur type of bomb. Many of you probably read about the nuclear reactor outside of Sydney near Homebush. Supposedly, a group from Auckland, New Zealand, had plans to blow this up. It turned out to be a lot more media hype than substance and received much more play than it warranted. One of the more interesting incidents involved a stuffed animal found at the airport. X-ray examination showed it to have two vials of liquid stuffed inside. When I left Sydney, they were still analyzing it but didn't think it was any type of biological agent. They were trying to figure out what kind of chemical it is. More importantly, they were trying to figure out what it was doing inside of this stuffed animal.
There were a few major gas leaks at the airport. Most importantly, they had an outbreak. One of the cruise ships reported a couple deaths on board, and it became a major story in the media. I was reading ProMED-mail every day in Sydney, and this story received a lot of attention there. It turned out that the deaths-of two crew members-were likely caused by the flu. They originally thought it might have been Legionella but ruled that out.
In summary, although bioterrorism was a concern, conventional weapons were still viewed as the greatest threat. However, the health agencies took the threat very seriously and incorporated significant planning for bioterrorism in all their plans.
An important point to note is that their surveillance system was good not only for bioterrorism but for monitoring food-borne outbreaks, flu outbreaks, and any other kind of public health emergency as well. With these dual systems, when planning surveillance for bioterrorism, surveillance for any other emerging type of public health threat must be considered as well. Finally, close links between the intelligence and public health communities were essential, which is something we need to work on in the United States. We learned that special events like the Olympics are an excellent catalyst for enhancing the public health infrastructure and bridging communication between the public health community and the medical community.
